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REGULATORY REFORM IN THE 
INTERCITY BUS INDUSTRY 
Cornish F. Hitchcock* 
Something is wrong with the intercity bus industry. 
• In some markets, taking the bus can be as expensive, if not 
more so, than flying or taking the train.1 
• Federal regulation has limited the ability of carriers to en-
gage in direct competition or to offer innovative services and 
fare options. 2 
• Bus service to small communities has been steadily declining 
across America. 3 
• Over the past decade, the financial health of the bus indus-
try has eroded steadily, and bus ridership today lags below levels 
attained in 1970:' 
• Bus travel is less comfortable than flying or going by train 
and a lot less popular. 5 
Thus, while Greyhound's commercials may claim "it's such a 
pleasure to take the bus," Trailways probably comes closer to 
the mark in observing that passengers "would prefer to travel by 
plane, automobile, or even truck, if given the chance, and will 
pay a premium to do so."8 
This troubled situation is a matter of great concern because 
• Director, Transportation Consumer Action Project, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1972, 
University of Chicago; J.D., 1975, Georgetown University. A different version of this Ar-
ticle was presented as testimony before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Public Works and Transportation on 
June 3, 1981. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and are not 
necessarily the views of the Transportation Consumer Action Project. 
1. See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra. 
2. See pt. Il B infra. 
3. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text infra. 
4. See pt. Il D infra. 
5. The 5.6 square feet of space available to bus passengers, on an average, is 60 to 
.80% of the average space afforded commercial airline passengers; train passengers get 3 
to 6 times as much room as bus passengers. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND 
TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INTERCITY DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
FOR PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT 335 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE 
STUDY]. In addition, bus travel was the only form of transportation rated negatively by 
the public in a Harris poll. Id. at 338. 
6. Comments of Trailways, Inc., at 19, Entry Flexibility, Regular Route Passenger · 
Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7, 1980) (ICC Ex Parte No. 
MC-133). 
1 
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the intercity bus industry constitutes a critically important 
means of transportation in this country. Bus companies carry 
more people each year than either the airlines or Amtrak. 7 Bus 
riders consist disproportionately of the elderly, minorities, the 
young, and the poor - members of the society who least can 
afford to travel.8 Furthermore, bus companies serve 14,600 com-
munities, roughly 14,000 of which receive no other intercity pub-
lic transportation; in contrast, the airlines offer scheduled ser-
vice to approximately 650 points, while Amtrak operates among 
550 communities.9 Finally, as American dependence upon high-
priced petroleum continues, bus travel takes on greater impor-
tance because it is the most fuel-efficient form of intercity 
transportation.10 · 
Whether anything can be done to improve intercity bus trans-
portation will depend ultimately on the industry itself, espe-
cially how it responds to shifting consumer demands. In order 
for the industry to gain the flexibility needed to improve public 
service, however, an important first step is congressional reform 
of economic regulation of the industry. Since 1935, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission ("ICC") has been deciding what 
firms can enter the industry, specifying the routes those firms 
can serve and the permissible fares and levels of service to be 
offered on those routes. Unfortunately, ICC regulation has been 
unduly rigid, contributing significantly to the high fares, limited 
competition, declining service patterns, and poor financial health 
of the industry. The current system of economic regulation has 
benefited neither the industry nor the public; it is time for a 
change. 
Over the past four years Congress has adopted laws to ''dereg-
ulate/' or at least reform, economic regulation of the airline, 11 
trucking,12 rail,13 and household-goods moving industries.14 Be-
7. AMERICAN Bus Ass'N, AMERICA'S MOST FUEL EFFICIENT PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION 
SERVICE 2 (1981) (hereinafter cited as 1981 ABA REPORT]. 
8. Id. See also E. Pinkston, The Intercity Bus Transportation Industry 132-36 (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (1976). 
9. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
10. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, INTERCITY Bus SERVICE IN SMALL COMMUNITIES 6 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY]. 
11. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in 
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)). 
12. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11901 (West Supp. 1981). 
13. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10705-10713 (West Supp. 1981). 
14. Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10734, 10934, 11110 
(West Supp. 1981). In non-transportation industries, Congress has adopted economic 
regulatory reform laws affecting natural gas, Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980), and interstate banking, Depository Institutions and Mon-
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cause these industries were subject to the same sort of economic 
regulation15 as the intercity bus industry, the question arises 
whether similar reforms in ICC control over bus transportation 
should be made, and whether any unique attributes of the in-
dustry counsel a different approach. The inquiry is especially 
timely because the United States House of Representatives has 
recently passed the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1981, 
designed to reform ICC economic regulation of the intercity bus 
industry.18 
etary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. -96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)). 
15. This Article discusses only economic or "cartel-type" regulation of the bus indus-
try: the ICC's determinations of what fares can be charged, what companies can serve 
what routes, and which firms can enter the industry. The Article does not address safety 
regulation, which presumably would continue under the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety 
("BMCS") in the U.S. Department of Transportation. Earlier "deregulation" bills take a 
similar approach. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 affected only the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board's route and rate determinations for domestic airlines, without modifying 
safety regulation carried out by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FM"). Similarly, 
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not modify truck safety regulation by the BMCS, and 
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 did not change rail safety regulation by the Federal Rail-
road Administration. 
The distinction is important because "deregulation" is a term somewhat porous in 
meaning; In the first place, cartel-type regulation of the sort traditionally practiced by 
the ICC and CAB often is lumped together with health, safety, environmental, and other 
"social" regulation of the sort practiced by the FM, Food and Drug Administration, 
Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies. This commingling is un-
fortunate, because the two are fundamentally different in character. In structurally com-
petitive industries, the former sort of regulation can stifle competition and raise prices 
paid by the public, often in the name of preventing "discrimination" and preserving 
"stability in the marketplace." The latter type of regulation, however, attempts to save 
lives and prevent injuries through the adoption of rules and standards that force compa-
nies to internalize costs paid by the public. For instance, standards requiring a company 
to decrease emissions- of air pollutants may reduce death and illness from respiratory 
illriesses; compliance costs are assumed by· the company and presumably passed along to 
the public, which presumably saves money it would otherwise spend on health care. 
The term "deregulation" also can be misleading because, even if cartel-type regulation 
is abolished for a particular industry, the industry still remains subject to tax, antitrust, 
securities, environmental, criminal and other laws - all regulating business conduct. For 
analytical clarity, rather than talking in terms of "deregulating" an industry, it would be 
preferable to speak of "decartelizing" or replacing cartel-type regulation with "market-
place regulation" that allows the marketplace to determine what services may be offered, 
what markets may be entered, and what prices may be charged. If marketplace regula-
tion is to replace cartel-type regulation, there must be a recognition that market failures 
will remain, which should be corrected. Even Adam Smith acknowledged that a tendency 
towards monopoly is an inevitable part of a free market. The antitrust laws and prohibi-
tions against-unfair and deceptive practices have traditionally been used in the United 
States to correct market failures, and such antitrust enforcement must play a key role in 
any conversion from cartel-type regulation to marketplace regulation. See pt. IV infra. 
16. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1981). 
As introduced in a different form on Mey 21, 1981, H.R. 3663 embodied regulatory re-
form proposals of the ICC and, along with H.R. 3662, supported by the American Bus 
Association, was considered in hearings during May and June 1981. See Hearings on 
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This Article will analyze the economic structure of the inter-
city bus industry and the type of service received by the public 
under the present regulatory scheme. It will then discuss what 
regulatory reforms could improve service, how these issues are 
addressed in the recent House-passed bill, and what further leg-
islative reforms should be made. 
I. THE INTERCITY Bus INDUSTRY: AN EcoNoMIC OVERVIEW 
A. Industry Structure 
The intercity bus industry comprises 1,330 firms, which oper-
ated 21,900 buses and earned operating revenues of nearly $2 
billion in 1980.17 These statistics do not, however, tell the full 
story; economic concentration, particularly concentration of rev-
enues, "is overwhelming in the bus industry."18 Of the industry's 
1,330 firms, 46 large interstate Class I carriers - those earning 
at least $3 million annually - accounted for 71 % of all passen-
ger revenues in 1979.19 In 1979, the last year for which figures 
are available, these large Class I carriers operated 89 % of "regu-
lar-route" passenger'miles and earned 92% of the revenues from 
this service.20 By contrast, most of the roughly 1,250 smaller 
Class II and Class ID carriers21 garnered much less revenue from 
regular-route service than from charters and special tours22 -
H.R. 3662 & 3663 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Public 
Works and Transportation Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 28 & June 3, 1981) [here-
inafter cited as House Bus Hearings] (because transcripts of these hearings have not yet 
been printed, page citations will be to the witnesses' prepared statements). 
17. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 5. Of these, roughly 850 are ICC-regulated 
interstate carriers. H.R. REP. No. 334, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as HousE REPORT], 
18. ICC BuREAu OF EcoNoMics, THE INTERCITY Bus INDUSTRY: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 
45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY]. 
19. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 53, table 4. 
20. MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CENTER, INC,, DEREGULATION OF THE INTERCITY Bus INDUS-
TRY 12-13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MAC DEREGULATION STUDY]. "Regular-route" ser-
vice is scheduled service offered between specified points over specified highways, and 
may include stops at intermediate points. 
21. Class I carriers have operating revenues in excess of $3 million annually; Class II 
carriers have operating revenues between $1 million and $3 million; and Class III carriers 
have operating revenues of less than $1 million. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra 
note 10, at 3. 
22. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 12. "Charter" service involves 
transportation of a preexisting group of passengers between a common origin and desti-
nation, e.g., a bus chartered to take a football team to and from a game. "Special" or 
"tour" service is similar to charter service, but the carrier forms the group, such as when 
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service that constitutes only a small part of Class I carriers' op-· 
erations.23 In a very real sense, then, the industry is highly seg-
mented: Class I carriers principally provide scheduled regular-
route service, while smaller companies specialize in charters and 
tour service. 
Among the 46 large Class I carriers, only Greyhound and 
Trailways have nationwide route systems, and these two firms 
dominate the industry. In 1980, they captured 81 % of Class I 
carrier revenues, Greyhound earning 59 % and Trail ways 22 % • 24 
In comparison, the third largest intercity carrier, Carolina Coach 
Co., earned less than 2 % of total Class I carrier revenues in 
1980.211 
This great market concentration might be explained on 
grounds of economic efficiency if the bus industry were charac- , 
terized by large fixed costs which would create significant econo-
mies of scale and barriers to entry.28 There exists no evidence, 
however, of high fixed costs in the intercity bus industry. For 
instance, depreciation and amortization comprised less than four 
percent of the operating expenses of Class I carriers in 1978 and 
1979,27 and new buses, the principal industry expense, cost only 
about $120,000 apiece in 1981.28 Moreover, a substantial market 
exists for less expensive, used buses. 29 
The presence of so many small bus carriers provides the most 
compelling evidence, buttressed by several economic studies, 30 
a company sponsors a sightseeing tour for which members of the public purchase tickets. 
SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 95-96. Bus companies also provide "package express" 
service as part of their regular-route service in order to move small packages. 
This Article will primarily discuss regular-route service. For a discussion of the other 
types of services, see ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 9-11. See also INTER-
STATE COMMERCE CoMM'N, REPORT OF THE Bus INDUSTRY STUDY GROUP, chs. I, IV & V 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as ICC Bus STUDY GROUP REPORT]. 
23. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 12. In 1979, for instance, Class Il 
and III carriers earned only 8% of the revenues from regular-route service, but captured 
61 % of the revenues for charters and tour services. Id. 
24. Id, at 16. These figures include Greyhound Lines, Inc.'s five wholly owned Class I 
subsidiaries and Trailways, Inc.'s 13 wholly owned Class I subsidiaries. 
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 22. 
26. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 267-69 (6th ed. 1981); E. MANSFIELD, 
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & APPLICATIONS 345-46 (2d ed. 1975). 
27. AMERICAN Bus Ass'N, AMERICA'S MosT FUEL EFFICIENT PASSENGER TRANSPORTA-
TION SERVICE 29 (1980). 
28. Statement of Theodore C. Knappen, Sr. Vice President, Trailways, Inc., at 9, in 
House Bus Hearings, supra note 16. 
29. Comments of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, at 5, Entry Flexibility, 
Regular Route Passenger Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7, 
1980) (ICC Ex Parte No. MC-133). 
30. See id. at 3-6; E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 15-22; Fravel, Returns to Scale in the 
U.S. Intercity Bus Industry, in PROCEEDINGS - 19TH ANNUAL MEETING 551-60 (Trans-
6 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:1 
that there are no significant economies of scale in the intercity 
bus industry. Indeed, one Department of Transportation survey 
indicated that many small intercity bus companies had average 
costs significantly lower than Greyhound,81 and even the Ameri-
can Bus Association has agreed that "small, regular route carri-
ers can compete successfully with larger carriers."32 Thus, con-
centration in the bus industry cannot be attributed to economies 
of scale or other market factors. Rather, the two-firm industry 
dominance has been engendered by regulatory policies which 
have promoted development by looking favorably on mergers 
and acquisitions while discouraging new entry. 
B. Industry Development 
The intercity bus industry began in the early 1900's when var-
ious entrepreneurs began using "buses" - closely resembling 
elongated sedans - to transport passengers throughout urban 
areas, into suburbs, and beyond to other cities.88 As automobile 
transportation grew in popularity, so did bus travel, and this de-
velopment led to improved roads, providing further impetus to 
expansion. Entry into the industry cost little, and by World War 
I hundreds of very small bus companies were offering local and 
regional service throughout the country.84 
As the industry expanded, state regulation began, first in 
Pennsylvania in 1914. Some states wanted to ensure passengers' 
safety. Other states, concerned more with the wear and tear on 
their highways, restricted the size and weight of motor vehicles. 
By 1930, every state except Delaware had imposed some form of 
regulation on bus companies. 35 
State regulation had a significant impact on the industry, 
portation Research Forum 1978). 
Pinkston suggests, however, that there may be advantages to a large scale of opera-
tions from a marketing standpoint, especially on longer distance travel, where passengers 
will wish if at all possible to stay on the same bus for the full length of the trip. Even if 
such through-service is not available, a larger company benefits from size in its ability to 
plan schedules to minimize layovers. Furthermore, the larger the carrier, the less likely it 
will be that a passenger will have to go to a separate terminal to change buses, or to deal 
with more than one company in handling tickets. E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 22-25. 
31. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION TRENDS 
& CHOICES (TO THE YEAR 2000) (1977). 
32. Comments of Am. Bus Ass'n, at 9a, Entry Flexibility, Regular Route Passenger 
Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7, 1980) (ICC Ex Parte No. 
MC-133). 
33. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 1. 
34. Id. 
35. E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 6. 
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which by 1925 had grown to 6,500 companies operating over 
7,800 routes. 38 State commissions decided to treat the bus indus-
try as a public utility or regulated monopoly37 by promoting sta-
bility as a major goal of the system. State regulators hoped to 
avoid direct competition, which they thought would result in 
buses operating with too many empty seats, higher costs, and 
poor service ~t fluctuating rates.38 Thus, they generally denied 
entry into territories already served "adequately" by another 
company - and even if existing service were found "inade-
quate," the incumbent carrier usually was provided the opportu-
nity to improve service before another company could operate 
on the route. 39 
Given this approach, it should not be surprising that the 
1920's witnessed many mergers between bus companies, because 
the regulators considered carrier size to be an indicator of 
financial stability and commitment to providing common-carrier 
service.-•° Furthermore, the demand for expanded long-haul ser-
vice compounded the trend toward concentration of the indus-
try, as small companies, typically operating 100 miles or less, 
found merger to be an easy means to meet this demand.41 Be-
tween 1926 and 1928 alone, the number of bus companies de-
clined from 4,040 to 3,610, even though route miles, bus miles, 
passengers carried, and operating revenues all were growing."2 In 
this climate the Motor Transit Corp. - the predecessor of Grey-
hound Lines, Inc. - was formed in September 1926, as a hold-
ing company capitalized at $10 million.43 
The Corporation grew rapidly in the late 1920's, owing to gen-
erally favorable economic factors, a capable management, and 
the financial strength and complementary nature of the bus 
companies absorbed into its system."" Greyhound, the name for-
mally adopted in 1930, also took advantage of the prevailing reg-
ulatory climate, persuading state agencies to let it acquire or 
control bus companies falling within their jurisdiction."5 Internal 
36. Id. at 5-6. 
37. B. CRANDALL, THE GROWTH OF THE INTERCITY Bus INDUSTRY 91-92 (1954). 
38. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 2. 
39. E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 7. See generally Jones, Origins of the Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity: Development in the States, 1870-1920, 79 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 426 (1979). 
40. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 2. A common carrier holds itself out to 
provide transportation to all passengers on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
41. Id. at 2-3. . 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 3. 
44. Id. 
45. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 82-83. 
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expansion -was facilitated further by a 1925 Supreme Court rul-
ing that state agencies had no jurisdiction to regulate economic 
activities of interstate bus companies.46 
Greyhound's strategy produced handsome returns. In 1927 
and 1928, the company expanded as far east as New York and as 
far west as Kansas City. Within another year, it acquired au-
thority to serve the western United States, and by 1934, it had 
obtained authority to operate to points in Canada. Internal 
growth, continued acquisition, and eventual consolidation into 
operating divisions within the company continued for another 
twenty years. 47 
A number of small regional carriers sought to counter Grey-
hound's emerging national network by devising a system of inte-
grated operating practices. In February 1936 they formed the 
National Trailways Bus System, whose member carriers agreed 
to accept each other's tickets for interline travelers, consolidate 
terminals and coordinate schedules, increase joint supervision of 
equipment and personnel, and adopt a common logotype for 
their operations and advertising. Within this group, one com-
pany - Trailways, Inc. - became dominant, and the National 
Trailways system grew into the second largest intercity bus 
operation. 48 
The National Trailways carriers were not alone in reacting to 
Greyhound's advances. Beginning in the late 1920's, state agen-
cies pressed for federal regulation over motor carriers.49 These 
sentiments drew support from the ICC, the regulator of the rail-
roads for over forty years, which recommended in 1928 that 
Congress enact a scheme of federal regulation for the bus indus-
try.110 Congress responded in 1935 with the Motor Carrier Act,111 
requiring the ICC to regulate interstate shipping rates, fares, 
routes, and services offered by both trucking and intercity bus 
companies.112 
During the rest of the 1930's, the ICC, like the state regula-
46. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). See also Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 
317 (1925). While invalidating economic regulation of interstate carriers, the Court up-
held state regulation of motor carrier safety. 
47. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 3. 
48. Id. at 5. 
49. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 83. 
50. Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I.C.C. 685, 746 (1928). 
51. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10521-10529 (West 
Supp. 1981)). 
52. Carriers in business on June 1, 1935, were generally able to obtain an ICC certifi-
cate of operation under "grandfather" provisions of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 306(a)(l) (1976) (repealed 1978), and some 3,000 bus companies received certificates in 
this fashion, SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 95. 
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tory bodies before it, took a favorable stance toward mergers 
and· acquisitions of bus companies as a means of fostering eco-
nomic stability. Thus, "[b]y the late 1930s, the economic struc-
ture of the bus industry had essentially evolved into its present 
form."113 The carriers enjoyed substantial prosperity during 
World War II, when auto travel was restricted.11• After the war, 
consolidations and mergers continued at a brisk pace, with the 
number of bus companies declining from 2,480 to 1,150 between 
1950 and 1960. 1111 The number of vehicles in operation during the 
1950's fell by 3,500, to 20,970, and passenger miles did not reach 
their 1952 peak of 24.7 billion again until 1967.118 Over the past 
twenty years, then, the bus industry has remained virtually stag-
nant, while other forms of public intercity transportation have 
shown impressive gains.117 
II. ICC REGULATION OF THE Bus INDUSTRY 
A. Fares 
The ICC has the responsibility to ensure that intercity bus 
fares are "reasonable. "118 Bus companies embody fare changes in 
"tariffs" filed with the Commission before the fares are sched-
uled to take effect. 119 Upon complaint or upon its own initiative, 
the ICC can suspend a proposed fare for seven months.80 The 
ICC has authority to cancel a fare for being too low, too high, 
unduly preferential, or unjustly discriminatory, and additionally 
can itself prescribe a lawful rate.81 
Bus companies can file tariffs either individually, or through 
the National Bus Traffic Association ("NBTA"), a "rate bureau" 
that serves as the tariff-publishing agent for almost 400 carriers 
who combined earn nearly ninety percent of intercity bus reve-
53. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 3. 
54. See C. TAFF, COMMERCIAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION 496 {5th ed. 1975). 
55. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 15. 
56. Id. 
57. Intercity travel has risen 300% since 1950, while bus miles are up only 20%, and 
the percentage of regular-route passenger miles has actually dropped 33% over the past 
30 years. Whereas in 1950, the intercity bus accounted for 4.5% of all intercity travel, its 
share in 1979 had dwindled to 1.8%. Statement of Arthur D. Lewis, President, American 
Bus Ass'n, at 7-8, in House Bus Hearings, supra note 16. 
58. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10701{a) {West Supp. 1981). 
59. Id. § 10762. 
60. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10708 {West Supp. 1981). 
61. Id. § 10704{a)(l). 
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nues.82 NBTA, though, is more than a trade association publish-
ing tariffs on its members' behalf. Under the Reed-Bulwinkle 
Act, 83 NBTA members enjoy immunity from the antitrust laws 
to engage in collective discussions and votes regarding fare levels 
they wish to propose to the ICC for its approval. Although bus 
companies remain free to file their own fare changes based upon 
individual costs, prevalent faresetting practice calls for NBTA 
members to discuss, agree upon, and submit to the ICC "general 
rate increases" whereby all participating carriers agree to raise 
their fares by a certain percentage. 84 
Differently put, bus companies set their fares much the same 
way that OPEC members set the price of crude oil. Such price 
fixing would be a per se violation of the antitrust laws for non-
regulated companies, and it "obviously lessens price competition 
and imposes unnecessary costs on consumers. "85 
Congress gave careful consideration to collective fixing- of 
truck rates in 1980 during debate on the Motor Carrier Act. 'In 
voting to end antitrust immunity for collective setting of "single-
line" rates and to make certain procedural reforms in the 
processing of new rate proposals in the trucking industry,88 the 
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation disap-
proved collective ratemaking, concluding that it "inherently 
tends to result in rates that will be compensatory for even the 
least efficient motor carrier participating in the rate discussions. 
When this happens, consumers lose the benefit of price competi-
tion. "87 The Committee also noted a "serious problem" in the 
closed nature of the rate bureau proceedings, where rate propos-
als are voted on behind closed doors, creating the opportunity 
for rate bureau employees largely to control the process.88 
Similar conclusions apply as well to collective determination 
of bus fares. While the intercity bus industry has substantially 
lower operating costs than either Amtrak or the airlines89 -
62. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 89. 
63. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706 (West Supp. 1981). 
64. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 89. 
65. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATl'ORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL CoMMIS• 
SION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 209 (1979). See also Carna-
tion Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213 (1966). 
66. A "single-line" rate is charged for transportation performed solely by one carrier 
over its own route system, in contrast to a "joint-line" or "interline" rate for transporta-
tion performed jointly by two or more carriers. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(l) (West 
Supp. 1981). 
67. H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in (1980) U.S. CODE CONG. 
& An. NEWS 2283, 2309 [hereinafter cited as MOTOR CARRIER A<:r HOUSE REPORT]. 
68. Id. . 
69. 1981 ABA R.EPoRT, supra note 7, at 5. 
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neither of which sets fares collectively with competitors - bus 
fares are not substantially lower than the cost of flying or taking 
the train. The failure of bus carriers to offer fares that reflect 
their cost advantage over other modes of public intercity trans-
portation severely indicts the industry's collective ratemaking 
approach. Standard bus fares generally are slightly lower than 
train or plane fares, but a comparision- of specific fares offered 
by Greyhound, Amtrak, and the airlines demonstrates that even 
this minor differential is not always in evidence.70 
• Between Denver and Salt Lake City, for example, the one-
way Amtrak fare is $56, compared to the one-way Greyhound 
coach fare of $57 .60. A one-way airline ticket costs only $60. 
• On long-distance routes, the balance is even more skewed. 
For instance, it costs $117 .60 for a 15-day excursion bus ticket 
between New York and Los Angeles; the trip takes 47 hours, and 
passengers must buy food for two days. By contrast, Capitol Air-
lines offers a $154 regular and a $129 standby fare, for a journey 
requiring one-eighth the time. 
• Finally, in a possible harbinger of things to come, a new air-
line, People Express, advertises air fares that are lower than bus 
fares in the same markets.71 
The Reed-Bulwinkle Act charges the ICC with ensuring that . 
rate bureau price fixing is conducted in a manner consistent 
with the national transportation pQlicy.u Not until the 1970's, 
however, did the Commission adopt rules to regulate rate bureau 
operations.78 This cursory approach by the ICC has two distinct 
effects. First, analysts have concluded that bureau procedures 
stifle competition and independent rate setting.74 This occurs 
70. These fares are based on a telephone survey conducted by the author in late May 
1981. See also MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 18, table ill-13. Federal 
subsidies have helped keep Amtrak fares at these comparable levels, but this situation is 
soon likely to change. Congress recently emphasized reducing Amtrak subsidies through 
such measures as raising fares, reducing management costs, and raising productivity. See 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1172, 95 Stat. 357,688 
(amending 45 U.S.C. § 501a (Supp. III 1979)). 
71. Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, § 10, at 2 ($59 New York-Florida fare). 
72. The national transportation policy is spelled out at 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (West 
Supp. 1981). The pertinent provision of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act is now codified at 49 
U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981). Technically speaking, rate bureau members 
draw up agreements on how the rate bureau will operate, and those agreements are filed 
with the ICC. Once approved, the bureau operations as authorized by agreement are 
immunized from the antitrust laws. 
73. See Rate Bureau Investigation, 351 I.C.C. 437 (1976). See generally SENATE 
COMM, ON THE JUDICIAllY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION IN 
THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY: ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 84-88 (Comm. 
Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as Jun1cww REPORT]. 
74. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 73, at 64-69. 
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because the required public notice of independent rate filings 
alerts the rate bureaus and deprives the carrier independently 
proposing a fare of a competitive edge. Furthermore, bureaus 
themselves can protest independently filed fares, even should no 
carrier object to the proposal. The analysts have found the sec-
ond major implication of lax ICC control over rate bureaus, 
closely related to the first, to be that bureau employees, rather 
than the carriers themselves, actually control the ratemaking 
process.711 
If the ICC has done little to control rate bureau procedures, it 
has done even less to control the end product: proposed fares. 
Between 1935 and 1973, the ICC conducted only three investiga-
tions of bus fare levels. In the first two investigations (in 1951 
and 1970), the Commission allowed the full increases sought, 
while the third (in 1973) led to approval of a three percent in-
crease instead of the five percent hike sought by the industry.76 
It staggers the mind to imagine that over a thirty-eight-year 
span only three fare hikes were deemed worthy of investigation, 
and only one was found excessive.'17 
For a brief period in the mid-1970's, the ICC did scrutinize 
requested rate hikes more closely, and even set some proposed 
increases at least partially aside.78 From 1979 through the third 
quarter of 1981, however, the Commission has rubberstamped 
all but one industry request for a general rate increase, paving 
the way for fares to rise at least 57 % , even though carrier costs 
did not rise this much and the consumer price index rose only 
35% during the same period.79 Furthermore, ICC fare regulation 
apparently has failed to protect rural bus users from paying 
higher fares than urban bus riders; fares paid, for instance, by 
75. MOTOR CARRIER ACT HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 27. 
76. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 89-90. 
77. See id. at 89-91; DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 12-13. This 
discussion does not apply to ICC permit applications for a "contract carrier" to serve 
only a limited number of customers. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 10923 (West Supp. 1981). 
78. See MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 4. If the ICC fails to exercise 
its statutory right to investigate and suspend proposed passenger rates, see 49 U.S.C.A. § 
10708 (West Supp. 1981), the rates become effective within 30 to 45 days, or sooner 
under special circumstances. See DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 12; 
MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 4. 
79. See ICC Office of Special Counsel, Protest and Petition for Suspension and Inves-
tigation, at app. B, Increased Passenger Fares and Express Rates: Nat'l Bus Traffic 
Ass'n, Suspension Case No. 70526 (ICC Sept. 28, 1981) (ICC approved seven general rate 
increases from Feb. 1979 through Sept. 1981); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT 3 (Sept. 1981) (Sept. 1981 consumer price index at 
279.3); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL-79-218, NEWS (March 
23, 1979) (Feb. 1979 consumer price index at 207.1). 
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riders in 38 small communities across America were 11 % above 
the national average. 80 
B. Licensing and Entry Policy 
Historically, an intercity bus company has been able to gain 
ICC approval to operate along specific routes in one of three 
ways: (1) by applying for a certificate granting new or expanded 
authority;81 (2) by obtaining a certificate under the "grandfa-
ther" provision of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act;811 or (3) by merg-
ing with or acquiring control of an existing carrier, or purchasing 
an ICC certificate from another carrier.83 This discussion will fo-
cus upon applications for authority, the most important means 
whereby new carriers can enter the industry and existing compa-
nies can expand their routes and services. 
1. The statutory standard and early interpretations- In or-
der to obtain an ICC certificate for new or expanded operating 
authority, an applicant must prove first that it is "fit, willing, 
and able"84 to provide the transportation while obeying ICC 
rules, and second that the service "is or will be _required by the 
present or future public convenience and necessity."811 This stan-
dard has been rigidly interpreted by the ICC to prevent the en-
try of any new competition that could cause existing carriers to 
lose revenue along the route in question. In the seminal case of 
Pan-American Bus Lines Operation,86 the ICC set forth a stan-
dard designed to ensure that new operating grants would not im-
pair the financial stability of existing carriers. Under this stan-
dard, the ICC would evaluate "public convenience and 
necessity," for purposes of granting a new operation or service, 
according to three factors: (1) whether the proposed transporta-
tion would "serve a useful public purpose, responsive to a public 
demand or need"; (2) whether existing service could adequately 
meet this public purpose; and (3) whether the proposed new op-
erations or service would "endange[r] or impai[r] the operations 
80. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2D 
SEss, INTERCITY Bus SERVICE IN SMALL COMMUNITIES 4 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter 
cited as SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY). 
81. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922 (West Supp. 1981). 
82. 49 U.S.C. § 306 (1976); see notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra. 
83. If one carrier wishes to merge with or acquire control of another carrier, it gener-
ally must receive prior 'approval from the ICC. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11343 (West Supp. 1981). 
84. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(a)(l) (West Supp. 1981). 
85. 49 U.S.C.A .. § 10922(a)(2) (West Supp. 1981). 
86. 1 M.C.C. 190 (1936). 
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of existing carriers contrary to the public interest. "87 Thus, ICC 
policy has placed gr_eat emphasis on preventing diversion of rev-
enues from incumbent carriers, thereby limiting passengers' 
ability to choose between competing companies.88 · 
Promoting the financial stability of corporations that perform 
useful public services may have been an appropriate federal pol-
icy objective during the Depression, but thirty years later, with a 
robust economy, the ICC still fretted over "duplication" of ser-
vice and the impact which competition could have on the bal-
ance sheets of existing carriers. For example, in 1965 the Com-
mission expressed concern that proposed new service between 
Boston and Rochester would allow two companies to compete 
directly, albeit over different routes, adding that "such a result 
is not looked upon with favor unless the evidence shows a need 
for the additional service, without any material harm to existing 
carriers. "89 
2. Recent entry policy- Starting in the mid-1970's, the ICC 
adopted a series of reforms designed to liberalize this restrictive 
entry policy for motor carriers of both passengers and freight 
traffic. Perhaps the most significant shift in approach came in 
1979 with a policy statement modifying the forty-three-year-old 
Pan-American test for judging route applications. While the 
Commission retained the requirement that the proposed opera-
tion "serve a useful public purpose responsive to a public de-
mand or need," it reversed the presumption - implicit in the 
Pan-American approach - against extensions of service, stating 
that operating authority consistent with the public purpose 
would be granted "unless it is established by parties opposing 
the application that the entry of a new carrier into the field 
would endanger or impair operations of existing common carri-
ers to an extent contrary to the public interest."90 
During the same period, the Commission used two proceed-
ings involving the Liberty Trucking Co. to erect high barriers to 
87. Id. at 203. 
88. For instance, in one 1938 case the ICC allowed New England Greyhound Lines to 
buy the property and operating rights of some smaller regional lines. The Commission 
noted that the acquisitions would "promote economical operation" by eliminating "much 
duplicate and wasteful mileage. In 1936 the departure times of applicant and vendors 
coincided with seven schedules. Applicant proposes to eliminate such duplication, thus 
obtaining a higher load factor." New England Greyhound Lines, Inc., 15 M.C.C. 536, 540 
(1938). 
89. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 101 M.C.C. 410, 414 (1965). 
90. Policy Statement on Motor Carrier Regulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,296 (Oct. 19, 
1979), review denied sub nom. Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 635 
F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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protestants alleging diversion of revenues. No longer would it be 
adequate for a carrier protesting an application for new service 
to show "mere evidence of revenues it may lose to [the] appli-
cant." Rather, a protestant would be required to demonstrate 
"why or how authorization of a competitive service will lead to 
substantial traffic diversion and material revenue loss" at such 
levels that "the new competition is likely to materially jeopard-
ize existing carriers' ability to serve the public. "91 Differently 
put, a protestant essentially would have to prove that a grant of 
new authority would cause serious harm not only to the affected 
route, but systemwide. 
In addition to these substantive changes, procedural reforms 
were enacted to help streamline ICC proceedings. As a means of 
simplifying applications for new · authority and reducing the 
filing of frivolous protests, the Commission limited the auto-
matic right to intervene in licensing cases to those carriers with 
a stake in the outcome. Protests could be lodged only by carriers 
that had authority to provide the service in issue, or that had 
offered to serve the community in question during the past 
twelve months.92 
These ICC initiatives provide carriers with their best opportu-
nity in years to obtain new authority. In previous times, though, 
the ICC has favored existing carriers - principally Greyhound 
and Trailways - at the expense of smaller and newer compa-
nies, not to mention the public. Between 1960 and 1970, the ICC 
considered only 130 new authority applications and denied a sig-
nificant number: 36 % of the regular route and 44 % of the char-
ter applications.93 Between 1975 and 1977, the ICC received only 
49 bus applications, mostly for scheduled regular-route service. 
Of these, 33 came from companies other than Greyhound or the 
Trailways system. Yet the ICC ·granted only 33 % of the applica-
tions from smaller companies, while authorizing nearly 88% of 
the Greyhound and Trailways requests.94 Between 1976 and 
91. Liberty Trucking Co., 130 M.C.C. 243, 245-46 (1978), review denied, 131 M.C.C. 
573 (1979); review denied sub nom. Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 
629 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980). 
92. Protest Standards in Motor Carrier Application Proceedings: Special Rules, 43 
Fed. Reg. 50,908 (Nov. 1, 1978), modified, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,277 (Dec. 27, 1978), aff'd sub 
nom. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 627 F.2d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
Congress adopted this standard in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. § 
10922(b)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1981), while the regulation's current version is at 45 Fed. 
Reg. 86,792 (1980) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § U00.252(d)(5)). 
93. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 97. 
94. Financial Condition of the Intercity Motor Bus Industry: Hearings Before the 
Stibcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977). 
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1978, the Commission received only 84 applications for regular-
route authority. Only five c~e from new companies, and all of 
these were granted; most others caine from companies seeking 
modest extensions of existing authority, a strategy designed to 
minimize opposition from incumbent carriers.911 
Given the low economic entry barriers in the industry, and the 
thousands of small carriers that existed before and after the im-
position of federal regulation,98 it is beyond question that "in 
the absence of ICC regulation, more carriers would have entered 
the industry or expanded their operations."97 While ICC policy 
has relaxed slightly in recent years, the difficulties involved in 
obtaining new authority still are so great that, according to the 
American Bus Association, a growing number of bus companies 
are offering new service without ICC approval, making the num-
ber of passengers being illegally transported a significant per-
centage of total traffic.98 
C. Exit Policy and Adequate Service 
1. Legal framework- The ICC creates substantial difficulties 
for carriers desiring to operate new routes, yet does little to pre-
serve service that it does license, despite the general policy no-
tion that exit should be restricted in regulated industries to en-
sure the provision of service.99 Bus companies can leave a 
market by (1) filing an application with the ICC,1°0 (2) simply 
stopping service in anticipation that there will be no protest, or 
(3) reducing service to a point where it becomes so inconvenient 
that no one travels by bus. Although carriers frequently drop 
service, 101 the available evidence suggests that ICC procedures 
frequently are bypassed. The ICC itself has candidly admitted 
that under the present system "formal action with regard to in-
terstate regular route service is limited to the handling of situa-
tions after the fact,"102 and a 1977 study prepared for the De-
partment of Transportation found "no significant [number of] 
applications to discontinue interstate regular route service.mos 
95. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 10. 
96. See notes 17-42 and accompanying text supra. 
97. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 97. 
98. Comments of Am. Bus Ass'n, supra note 32, at 10. 
99. See c. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 79 (rev. ed. 1969). 
100. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10925(b) (West Supp. 1981). 
101. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text infra. 
102. ICC Bus STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 22, at 37. 
103. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 11. 
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Thus, formal ICC mechanisms for controlling exit policy appar-
ently have played only a marginal role in preventing the discon-
tinuation of service by authorized carriers.104 
The most effective barrier to exit has been the insistence of 
state regulatory bodies that a bus company continue to serve the 
intrastate portion of an interstate route, even when the ICC has 
authorized abandonment of the interstate route.105 While such 
policies have short-term consumer benefits, they also produce a 
balkanized transportation policy under which a federal agency 
permits certain service to end while a state agency requires part 
of that service to continue.108 The result seems contrary to the 
congressional goal of a national transportation policy.107 
Even restrictive state exit policies, however, cannot ensure the 
provision of good service. Bus companies can effectively exit 
from a market, even though nominally offering service, simply 
by dropping frequencies or scheduling their departures and ar-
rivals at such inconvenient hours that service deteriorates. A 
downward spiral follows; as service worsens, ridership declines 
even further.108 Although the ICC does have legal authority to 
regulate the adequacy of bus service, 109 regulations in this area 
were not adopted until 1977, and those dealt mostly with con-
sumer protection issues110 and did nothing to regulate schedul-
104. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 104; SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra 
note 80, at 8. · · 
105. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 24-27, 53-55. 
106. See statement of Marcus Alexis, Acting Chairman, ICC, at 15, in House Bus 
Hearings, supra note 16; SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 8. 
107. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (West Supp. 1981); cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corp. 101 S.Ct. 1309 (1981) (Iowa statute that limited operation of twin trailers in Iowa 
struck down as a burden on interstate commerce; all surrounding states permitted- twin 
trailers to operate within their borders). See also NATIONAL TRANSP. POLICY STUDY 
CoMM'N, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICIES THROUGH THE YEAR 2000, at 248 (1979). 
108. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 104. By allowing service to deteriorate, the in-
cumbent carrier still remains in a position to add new frequencies if traffic increases, and 
also can protest new entry by another carrier. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 
10, at 12. 
. 109. 49 U.S.C.A. § lll0l(b) (West Supp. 1981). 
110. 49 C.F.R. pt. 1063 (1980). Even if viewed as consumer protection rules, the ICC 
rules are paltry, particularly when compared with the protections available for other 
modes of travel For example, the ICC limits bus company liability for lost or damaged 
luggage to $250 per passenger, a sum which cannot begin to compensate a passenger for 
the ordinary contents of two suitcases. The limits for Amtrak and domestic air travel, by 
contrast, are $500 and $750, respectively. 
Furthermore, airline and Amtrak passengers have long been able to purchase excess 
value coverage to increase the carrier's liability for lost or damaged luggage. In 1979, the 
ICC proposed a rule to let bus passengers obtain such coverage, effective January l, 
1980. Before the rule took effect, however, the ICC bowed to an industry request to 
postpone the effective date. It took the Commission 16 months before the rule was re-
issued, with an effective date in May 1981. The industry once again asked for a delay, 
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ing or to prescribe minimum service levels. Thus, while intercity 
bus carriers may operate among 14,600 communities across 
America,m that figure gives no accurate indication of the quality 
of service provided. 
2. Small community service- One of the philosophical under-
pinnings of the ICC's "tight entry, tight exit" policy is the need 
to protect and ensure service to small communities across 
America. The theory, traditionally applied in a · public utility 
context, posits that service between major points is profitable 
enough to "cross-subsidize" unprofitable service to small and ru-
ral points which would go unserved if the carrier were not com-
pelled to serve profitable and unprofitable routes alike.112 
this time for 90 days (or until after the peak summer season had passed), and once again 
the ICC granted the request. See Practices of Motor Common Carriers of Passengers -
Checked Baggage Liability Provisions, 132 M.C.C. 560, effective date deferred, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 27,343 (1981) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1064.1). See generally DOT SMALL 
COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 13. 
111. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
112. It has been suggested, somewhat more persuasively, that there are cross-
subsidies between charter, special, and package-express service, on the one hand, and 
regular-route service, on the other. To the degree such subsidies exist in a regulated 
environment, they would probably exist in a less regulated environment as well, without 
affecting the quality or availability of service to rural communities. 
For example, the argument has been made that charter and special services have been 
more profitable than regular-route service. See E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 29-33. This 
may occur because such services can he operated more efficiently, in that it is easier to 
concentrate on the most lucrative markets and to operate such services with a higher 
percentage of seats filled. 
Until 1967, the ICC automaticaliy awarded charter and special-tour authority when it 
awarded regular-route authority, and it was not unusual for companies to apply for the 
latter in order to obtain the former supposedly "incidental" authority. See ICC PRELIMI-
NARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 10. Although carriers were obligated to perform regular-
route operations in order to keep their charter and tour authority, the ICC deemed once-
weekly service sufficient in this regard. Id. In 1966, however, Congress amended the law 
to eliminate this practice and to require that applicants for charter and special authority 
request and prove the need for this service separately. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 10932(c) (West 
Supp. 1981). 
Thus, some carriers today find themselves forced to operate regular-route service in 
order to maintain authority for charter and tour services. But for these carriers, running 
a limited amount of regular-route service should not be burdensome, because the margi-
nal cost of operating such service, over and above their profitable charter and tour busi-
ness, should he fairly low. So long as regular-route revenues exceed the marginal costs of 
offering such service, such operations make economic sense and would not necessarily be 
discontinued in a less regulated environment. Service that turns a profit, albeit a lower 
profit than other service, is not truly "subsidized," and likely would be continued under 
a deregulated regime. 
Several other factors suggest that cross-subsidization between types of service is not 
crucial to maintaining adequate levels of rural service. In the first place, Class I carriers 
concentrate on regular-route service, while smaller carriers focus on charters and tours. 
In 1980, charters and tours accounted for only 14.6% of Class I carrier earnings, and 
78% of all charter and tour revenues were earned by carriers other than Greyhound and 
Trailways. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 53. This high degree of segmentation sug-
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This approach, however, has not worked in the bus industry 
- either in theory or in practice. Little empirical evidence can 
be discovered to suggest that certain routes cross-subsidize 
others, or that rural .points would go unserved but for ICC regu-
lation. In the first place, it is virtually impossible, from an ana-
lytical standpoint, to tell which routes cross-subsidize each 
other.U3 Second, a major element of traditional public utility 
regulation - forced service to rural points - is absent in the 
intercity bus industry. The laxness of ICC exit policy places few 
practical restrictions on companies wishing to abandon or reduce 
unprofitable service.114 It is probable that bus companies serve 
routes not because of ICC compulsion, but because ·the service 
makes economic sense by feeding rural passengers onto long-
haul routes or otherwise fitting into a carrier's overall route 
network.1115 
gests that charter service is only a small part of regular-route carriers' business, and 
there is no hard evidence to suggest that it keeps them operating on otherwise unprofita-
ble routes. 
In addition, it has been suggested that package express is more profitable than regular-
route service. While that may be true, it does not indicate a true cross-subsidy, because 
the two services cannot be severed. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 9-10. 
Package express necessarily moves on a bus carrying passengers; thus the two services 
are more appropriately considered in tandem. 
113. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 9-10. The complexities of finding 
cross-subsidies are formidable. The Senate study neatly summarized the methodological 
problem: 
Consider, for example, a hypothetical bus line from the small community of Elk-
ton, Md., through Wilmington, Del., to Philadelphia, Pa. Suppose that on a typi-
cal bus run 10 people ride the full route from Elkton to Philadelphia, two ride 
only the Elkton-Wilmington segment, and 20 ride the Wilmington-Philadelphia 
segment. If the route segments are viewed separately, the Elkton-Wilmington 
segment, with just 12 passengers, look [sic) unprofitable, while the Wilmington-
Philadelphia segment, with 30 passengers, seems considerably more lucrative. 
Yet, if the bus company were to drop its Elkton-Wilmington service - assuming 
it could obtain approval by the regulatory authorities to do so - it would risk 
losing the 10 passengers on the Wilmington-Philadelphia run who embarked in 
Elkton. Because they would have to find alternative service from Elkton to Wil-
mington to catch the bus there, these passengers would be inclined to switch 
modes for the entire trip, if that were feasible. The Wilmington-Philadelphia 
segment would be left with only 20 passengers, which at best would be only mar-
ginally profitable. Thus, it frequently does not make sense to disaggregate a 
transportation system into its component parts in attempting to determine the 
profitability of different routes. In this hypothetical case, the company must de-
cide whether its overall profit position is better with or without the unprofitable 
segment. The complexity of this determination grows exponentially with the 
number of towns served; even with the aid of the largest, newest computers, the 
cross-subsidization issue is a difficult one to resolve. 
SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 18-19. See also E. Pinkston, supra 
note 8, at 13-62; ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 93-96. 
114. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra. 
115. This has, in fact, been admitted by a Greyhound executive, who said that "a 
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Despite almost fifty years of pervasive regulation, the network 
of rural service in this country forms a patchwork quilt. 116 
Roughly 23 % of all communities in the country that have a pop-
ulation between 2,500 and 10,000 receive no direct bus service 
under the current regulatory regime, although effective service is 
available to all but 9 % of these communities after taking ac-
count of service to points less than 10 miles away.117 
The quality and quantity of this service, however, can vary 
widely. Some communities receive daily service, some receive 
less than daily service, and some receive no service at all.118 One 
study of service patterns to 38 small communities across 
America found the median number of departures each week to 
be 50 passengers, ranging from a low of 3 to a high of 800. Arriv-
als also averaged 50 passengers per week, with a range of 3 to 
900, although most tended to be under 105.119 
The ICC's failure to assure service to small communities is 
hard to overstate. During the 1970's, the Commission allowed 
bus companies to abandon service to over 1,800 communities 
across America.120 Bus companies have been dropping service, 
on an average, roughly at the rate of 15 towns every month over 
a ten-year period. When coupled with the ICC's restrictive en-
try policy, which keeps new companies out, this regulatory 
scheme cannot be said to have provided good bus service for the 
people of rural America. 
good many" of the company's unprofitable routes would be continued under less regula• 
tion "because they are good feeders . • • or they fit into the route structure in other 
ways." Pace, Talking Business, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1981, at D2, col. 1. 
116. Bus service to Breezewood - a community of 2,500 people in south-central 
Pennsylvania - cogently illustrates the lack of a cohesive pattern in rural bus transpor-
tation. Breezewood stands at the junction of three major highways and is used by Grey-
hound as a key stopping point on the carrier's east-west routes. As a result, over two 
dozen bus routes service Breezewood daily. In contrast, halfway between Pittsburgh and 
Breezewood on U.S. route 30 is the town of Ligonier, also having a population of 2,500. 
Ligonier receives bus service only on Friday, when two buses leave for Pittsburgh and 
one returns. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 15. 
Admittedly, some communities may not enjoy improved service as a result of regula-
tory reform in the intercity bus industry. If this indeed occurs, though, it would result 
from market forces in the deregulated environment rather than the inefficiencies of ICC 
regulation. 
117. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 3. 
118. Id. at 15. 
119. SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 5. 
120. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 22;· DOT SMALL COMMUNITY 
STUDY, supra note 10, at ii. 
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Regime 
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The combination of OPEC-style price hikes, restrictive entry, 
and declining service may explain why passengers are flocking to 
the airlines, Amtrak, or their automobiles, and consider taking 
the bus only as a last resort. Historically, the ICC has been gen-
erous to existing carriers at the expense of the traveling public, 
but ironically, that generosity has not translated into a 
financially healthy industry. In 1979, the president of the Ameri-
can Bus Association spoke of the "long term erosion of [ the bus 
industry's] viability,"121 and the statistics bear him out. The in-
dustry's operating ratio - operating expenses as a percentage of 
operating revenues - worsened from 90.1 in 1970 to 93.1 in 
1980, 122 and between 1971 and 1977 return on equity declined 
from 16.1% to 8.4%.123 From 1968 to 1978, the bus industry's 
net operating revenues plummeted 38 % , while passenger miles 
on Class I regular-route travel decreased 15%, and the number 
of passengers fell 27 % • 124 The only exceptions to this downward 
trend came in 197 4 and 1979-1980, when soaring energy prices 
and the scarcity of gasoline led consumers to take the bus in 
increasing numbers; nonetheless, bus ridership is less today than 
it was in 1970.1211 This bleak picture makes clear that ICC regu-
lation of the intercity bus industry serves the best interests of 
neither the public nor the industry; the time for a change has 
come. 
Ill. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
This Article's central thesis is that the traveling public, not to 
mention the carriers themselves, would benefit from the substi-
tution of marketplace competition for ICC-cartel regulation of 
the intercity bus industry. As a general proposition, this substi-
tution would require four major changes in present federal regu-
lation of the bus industry. First, there must be an end to anti-
trust immunity for collective setting of bus fares and rates, a 
121. AMERICAN Bus Ass'N, AMERICA'S MosT FUEL EFFICIENT PASSENGER TRANSPORTA· 
TION SERVICE 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 ABA REPORT]. 
122. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 52. 
123. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 13. 
124. 1979 ABA REPORT, supra note 121, at 29. 
125. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 5. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1980, at D1, 
col. 3. 
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step that would promote greater price competition. Second, 
there must be open entry for all "fit, willing, and able" bus com-
panies - those that can meet federal safety and insurance re-
quirements - to allow carriers to operate any type of service 
over any route without first seeking ICC permission. Third, ICC 
exit policy must be reformed to require carriers seeking to leave 
a market to notify the affected communities, enabling them to 
search for a replacement carrier or to make arrangements for 
keeping the incumbent on the route. While this would constitute 
more regulation over exit than the ICC exercises presently, it 
should be seen as a transitional device designed to aid smaller 
communities and could be phased out as new carriers surface to 
provide additional bus service. Finally, to promote uniformity in 
the system, there must be federal preemption over the intrastate 
portions of interstate service, if not full preemption of all state 
control over intrastate service. 
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1981, passed recently by 
the House of Representatives, makes some reforms along these 
lines but does not go far enough. The Act abolishes antitrust 
immunity for the collective setting of some fares, but carriers 
still can collectively set "general rate increases" that raise fares 
industry-wide by a fixed percentage. With regard to entry, carri-
ers must still go through cumbersome ICC proceedings every 
time they want to add a new route, although the standards could 
make it somewhat easier to obtain this new authority. The bill 
makes no change, however, in the Commission's current lax pol-
icy on exit, and state regulation of the industry is preempted 
only to the extent that carriers can appeal to the ICC if a state 
agency makes an adverse ruling on the intrastate portion of an 
interstate route. 
Thus, greater efforts at reform are needed. The following sec-
tions will propose and explain detailed recommendations for re-
form in the key areas of fares, entry, and exit, will comment on 
the impact of such reforms upon rural service, and will analyze 
the provisions of the recent House-passed bill in each of these 
areas. 
A. Fares 
1. Collective ratemaking- Congress shoajd, effective immedi-
ately, repeal antitrust immunity for collective discussion and 
voting on bus fares, including general rate increases. Such collec-
tive price fixing has significantly boosted fares to the public, and 
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over the past forty-six years the ICC has proven itself unable to 
monitor fares effectively.126 Considering the disparity between 
the unit costs of individual carriers, 127 it makes no sense to allow 
the setting of uniform rates that do not reflect each carrier's 
costs. 
Such a reform would replace overt price collusion with price 
competition, to the benefit of the public. In this area, the House-
passed bill makes some reforms, notably by ending, effective 
January 1, 1984, antitrust immunity for collective setting of 
"single-line" fares - those offered by a single carrier operating 
between two points.126 This would end the most blatant type of 
horizontal price fixing; for example, Greyhound and Trailways 
could no longer agree on the fare each would charge for service 
between New York and Washington. Beginning January 1, 1984, 
the House-passed bill also limits immunity for "joint-line" fares 
- those offered by two or more companies for connecting ser-
vice between two points. Under this provision, carriers would en-
joy antitrust immunity to discuss and set joint-line fares only if 
each could individually "practicably participate" in offering the 
service in question.129 
While the House-passed bill thus goes further than the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980, iso it is still deficient in its treatment of 
ratemaking because it continues antitrust immunity for general 
rate increases. This is a significant omission, in light of the in-
dustry tradition and preference for across-the-board general rate 
126. See text at notes 75-80 supra. 
127. See E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 15-16. Pinkston's study, drawing on 1972 data, 
found that average costs per bus-mile ranged from $0.45 to $4.10, and that the variation 
was not correlated with output. Of the 72 carriers surveyed, 39 had average costs be-
tween $0.60 and $0.80 per bus-mile. Interestingly, Greyhound's average cost was on the 
high side, at $0.86 per bus-mile. Id. at 17-18. 
A more recent analysis, performed by the Council on Wage and Price Stability and 
based on 1978 d_ata, surveyed the costs per bus-mile of 43 Class I carriers and found a . 
range from $0.90 to $3.70 per bus-mile. Again, there was no correlation between this 
extreme variation and output: 31 carriers had costs below $1.40, and 12 carriers (includ-
ing Greyhound) had costs above that level. Comments of the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability, supra note 29, at 4. 
Even among the industry giants, there are disparities in costs. In the first quarter of 
1981, Greyhound's total operating expense was $1.986 per bus-mile, a figure 12% higher 
than Continental Trailways' cost of $1.7666 per bus-mile. ICC Office of Special Counsel, 
Protest and Petition for Suspension and Investigation, supra note 79, app. B, at 4. 
128. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b)(4), 127 CoNG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. 
Nov. 19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(3)(E)). 
129. Id; see notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra. 
130. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 ends immunity for collective setting of single-line 
truck rates on January 1, 1984. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1981). Immu-
nity continues, however, for discussions and voting on joint-line rates and general rate 
increases. 
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hikes, the staggering level of ICC-approved rate hikes, the domi-
nance of regular-route service by only two firms, and the fact 
that carriers can seek fixed-percentage increases in fares despite 
wide disparities in their costs. Elimination of antitrust immunity 
for the setting of general rate increases, thus requiring individ-
ual fares to be tailored to specific carrier costs, would greatly 
benefit the public. 
2. Zone of pricing freedom- The House-passed bill creates a 
zone of pricing freedom within which individual fares can be of-
fered without the risk that they will be suspended by the ICC as 
"unreasonable. msi The zone extends as high as ten percent 
above and twenty percent below the rate in effect one year ear-
lier. In addition, the ICC is given authority to extend, for the 
public benefit, the upper and lower limits of this zone by ten 
percent should it find actual and potential competition sufficient 
to control fares.132 All rates within the zone of pricing freedom 
are subject to the antitrust laws and must be filed individually, 
not as a result of collective action. 183 
While a zone of pricing freedom can benefit the public by 
keeping the ICC from blocking innovative or competitive fares, 
such a zone must be carefully crafted and linked to the degree of 
actual and potential entry which would be available to keep 
rates in line. The House-passed bill fails to do this; it allows too 
much upward pricing flexibility too quickly, without enough new 
entry. Under the House provision, fares could increase as much 
as forty-four percent in two years.13' Given the two-firm domi-
nance in the industry, reasonable limits on upward pricing flex-
ibility must be maintained in the short term. If existing entry 
regulation is not relaxed significantly, the very real possibility 
arises that bus companies will try to boost fares higher than they 
would otherwise - and without the spur of new competition to 
keep fares in line. 
A better approach, taken in the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978,1315 would link upward pricing flexibility to new entry. That 
131. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § ll(a), 127 CONG. RBc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 
19, 1981) (adding new para. 4 to 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d)). 
132. Id. (adding new para. 5 to 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d)). 
133. Id. § ll(b) (applying 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d}(4) to bus fares). 
134. Suppose the fare in effect on the date of enactment of this hill was $20. H a 
carrier takes advantage of the 10% upward zone and the ICC has, in addition, author-
ized an additional 10% zone on top of that, the fare could go up 20%, to $24. That $24 
would then be the base for increases in the second year, and another 20% hike could 
raise the fare to $28.80 - 44% above the-level two years earlier. 
135. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered §§ of 49 U.S.C. (Supp. 
III 1979)). 
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Act set a baseline for judging the reasonableness of air fares, 
which the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") was directed to ad-
just at least twice yearly for inflation.138 The statute created a 
zone of pricing freedom five percent above and fifty percent be-
low the baseline, within which fares could not be suspended as 
"unreasonable"187 - although for the first three years the CAB 
was directed to make route awards under less stringent stan-
dards188 and procedures.139 
· The Act was careful to allow full entry freedom before giving 
the airlines significant pricing flexibility. After December 31, 
1981, the CAB loses authority to issue to financially "fit, willing 
and able" carriers certificates that specify the routes to be oper-
ated.140 Only a full year after losing control over entry will the 
Board be deprived of all power to suspend or reject fares as 
unreasonable.141 
This format is preferable because it assumes that distortions 
in carrier route systems fostered by regulation may have pro-
duced reservoirs of monopoly power that could take three to 
four years for market forces to correct. By phasing in entry free-
dom before pricing freedom, Congress limited the ability of air 
carriers with monopoly power in particular markets to exploit 
their advantage by raising prices to unreasonable levels while 
knowing that, as a: practical matter, new entry was unlikely in 
the short term.142 In contrast, the House-passed bill for deregu-
136. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 37(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (Supp. III 1979) 
(amending Federal Aviation Act § 1002(d)). 
137. Id. 
138. . Instead of being "required by" the public convenience and necessity, new service 
merely had to be "consistent with" the public convenience and necessity. Id. § 8, 49 
U.S.C. § 1371(d)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1979) (amending Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)(l)(A)). 
In addition, the burden of proving inconsistency with the public convenience and· neces-
sity was shifted to protestants. Id. § 14, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (Supp. III 1979) (adding new 
para. 8 to Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)). Airlines were also allowed to enter one new 
route each year without first obtaining CAB approval. Id. § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) 
(Supp. III 1979) (adding new para. 7 to Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)). 
139. Procedures were streamlined for airlines wishing to operate "dormant" authority 
issued to but not used by another airline. Id. § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (Supp. III 1979) 
(adding new para. 5 to Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)). Before this reform, airlines could 
successfully protest applications to serve routes where they were authorized to operate 
but were not doing so. 
The Act also streamlines route cases by allowing written submissions to be used exten-
sively instead of oral hearings. Id. § 21, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. III 1979) (adding Fed-
eral Aviation Act § 401(p)). Finally, the Act removes "closed door" restrictions which 
prevented airlines from discharging passengers at intermediate stops on a flight. Id. § 16, 
49 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. ill 1979) (adding Federal Aviation Act § 401(e)). 
140. Federal Aviation Act§ 1601(a)(l)(A), 49 U.S.C. § 155l(a)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1979). 
141. Id. § 1601(a)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2) (Supp. ill 1979). 
142. The Airline Deregulation Act attempted to minimize such short-term profiteer-
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lating the bus industry does not tie pricing freedom to entry. 
The bill grants an immediate ten-percent zone of upward pricing 
freedom, even though entry still will be determined on an expen-
sive and time-consuming case-by-case basis. Moreover, notwith-
standing the ·connection between pricing flexibility and entry 
freedom, a ten-percent upward zone is overgenerous, given that 
many routes are served by only one carrier, and that two compa-
nies dominate regular-route service. 
The best approach in this area would be for Congress to end 
route regulation immediately, while implementing a scheme of 
increased pricing flexibility. This pricing scheme should estab-
lish as baseline fares those in effect one year earlier, and should 
create a statutory zone, reaching five percent above and fifty 
percent below the baseline, within which fares cannot be sus-
pended as "unreasonable."148 The ICC should not have authority 
to after the upper boundary· of this zone, 144 and all ICC control 
over rates should cease four years after enactment. During the 
four-year transition period, carriers would remain· free to seek 
fare changes falling outside th_e zone, which would have to be 
justified as •~reasonable." The four-year period would allow car-
riers to take advantage of entry reforms to rationalize their route 
systems in ways that could lead to a more competitive system, 
justifying the subsequent removal of federal controls over inter-
city bus fares. 
ing, in contrast to air.cargo deregulation legislation passed one year earlier. See Pub. L. 
No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (codified in scattered §§ of 49 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)). The 
cargo law decontrolled rates upon enactment, but barred new entry into the industry for 
one year. Id. §§ 17(a), 18, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1388(a)(3), 1482 (Supp. III 1979) (adding Federal 
Aviation Act § 418(a)(3), and amending id. § 1002). Not surprisingly, the existing cargo 
carriers promptly boosted their prices, and Congress was careful not to put the cart 
before the horse a second time. See Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings on H.R. 
11145 Before the Subcomm." on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and 
Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1978) (testimony of CAB Chairman Alfred E. 
Kahn). See also Impact of Airline Deregulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Avi-
ation of the Senate Comm.' on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 54-55 (1979) (statement of CAB Chairman Marvin S. Cohen). 
143. These are the limits created by the Airline Deregulation Act. See Federal Avia-
tion Act § 1002(d)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1551(d)(4) (Supp. III 1979). 
144. The Airline Deregulation Act gives the CAB authority to change the downward, 
but not the upper, limit under the Federal Aviation Act, ·§ 1002(d)(7), 49 U.S.C. § 
1482(d)(7) (Supp. III 1979). By contrast, the ICC can -adjust both the upper and lower 
limits of the zone of pricing freedom for truck rates. 49.U.S.C. § 10708(d)(2) (West Supp. 
1981). 
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The public interest would best be served if Congress were to 
end, effective immediately, ICC regulation over entry into mar-
kets and over decisions regarding the kinds of services to be pro-
vided in those markets. The ICC properly should retain only the 
role of requiring new companies to prove they are financially 
"fit, willing and able" to provide whatever type of bus service 
they choose to offer.145 No sound economic reason exists for obli-
gating a bus company to undergo cumbersome ICC procedures 
every time it seeks to add communities or services to its route 
structure. 
1. The entry barrier presented by ICC procedures- The 
major flaw of the House-passed bill is its requirement that the 
ICC continue issuing new authority on a c~e-by-case basis. 
Every time a carrier wants to expand operations, no matter how 
modestly, it must apply for and receive permission from the 
ICC. ICC _procedures can themselves be a major entry barrier, 
particularly for small companies, and may explain why so few 
companies apply for new authority. An applicant for new au-
thority must pay a $350 filing fee, 148 and probably a minimum of 
$1,000 for the necessary assistance of counsel. Even should no 
protests be filed, the Commission may determine that the appli-
cant has not demonstrated sufficient public need for the new 
service and thus deny the application in part, if not entirely. If, 
however, a carrier does protest, or if the Commission decides to 
require oral hearings, the bill for legal fees increases while the 
chances of success diminish. Furthermore, disgruntled protes-
tants still can go to court if an applicant is successful before the 
ICC, consuming more time and money, and possibly depriving 
the public· of new service in the interim.147 
145. The House-passed bill adds a statutory gloss to the definition of "fit, willing and 
able" by stating that the term "includes, among other things, financial fitness, operation• 
al fitness, and safety fitness." H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CoNG. REc. 
H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1981) (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(7)). To promote safety, § 
18(b) of H.R. 3663 sets minimum insurance levels of $5 million for vehicles with a capac• 
ity of more than 15 passengers and $1.5 million for vehicles with a capacity of 15 passen-
gers or less. The Secretary of Transportation may, after a rulemaking proceeding, cut 
those levels in half, but only for a two-year transitional period. In addition, § 22 of H.R. 
3663 would amend 49 U.S.C. § 10925(d) to let the ICC, upon request of the Secretary of 
Transportation, suspend the certificate if the Commission finds that such carrier has 
been "conducting unsafe operations which are an imminent hazard to public health or 
property." 
146. 49 C.F.R. § 1002.2(d), pt. 1(3) (1980). 
147. Evidence in bus licensing cases tends to consist of statements by members of the 
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Such a system can deter all but the most affluent, the most 
determined, or the most litigious, and it should come as no sur-
prise that the ICC receives only a handful of bus applications 
each year.148 In fact, the impact of present procedures in deter-
ring new entry can be seen clearly in the industry's response to 
an emergency order issued by the ICC in mid-1979 as a reaction 
to the Iranian oil embargo and subsequent gasoline scarcity. 149 
The Commission allowed bus companies to initiate service that 
summer to any point they chose, simply by filing a form. During 
the three months that the interim procedures were in effect, the 
ICC received half as many applications for new authority as it 
had received in the previous three years.1110 This actual experi-
public either that (1) existing service is poor and if new service were allowed, the individ-
uals supporting the application would use it, or (2) existing service is adequate and 
would be impaired if new service were authorized. It is hard to imagine how such state• 
ments are helpful to the ICC in predicting whether new service should be authorized, 
and it is even harder to imagine the usefulness of having that testimony presented at an 
oral hearing, subject to cross-examination. As the Commission observed: 
The very nature of [evidence in bus licensing cases] is that it will be generalized. 
The testimony is often given by laymen, the service needed is nonrepetitive in 
nature, and often includes leisurely travel for which a future need or commit-
ment cannot directly be stated. 
We see little reason to subject unsophisticated passenger witnesses to exten-
sive cross-examination in routine cases merely to drive home a point the Com-
mission has recognized for years - the nature of passenger travel is such that 
even rather unspecific predictions by potential users are difficult. 
Rules Governing Applications for Operating Authority, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,771, 86,783 (Dec. 
31, 1980) (ICC Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43)). 
The difficulties - and expense - of such proceedings are illustrated in a recent deci-
sion in which Greyhound challenged an application by Trailways Tamiami to operate 
between Atlanta and Orlando. Tamiami obtained 423 public witnesses in favor of the 
new service, and Greyhound lined up 390 opponents. After a 19-day hearing at which 327 
of these witnesses testified, an ICC board granted the application. Another year was con-
sumed by Greyhound's appeal to the full Commission, and yet another year by Grey-
hound's unsuccessful court appeal. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. ICC, [1981) F'Eo. CARR. REP. 
(CCH) 11 82,956 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1981). 
148. See notes 93-98 and accompanying text supra. For example, during July 1981, 
the ICC published 1551 applications in the Federal Register for authority to operate as a 
motor carrier of freight, compared to only 79 applications for passenger authority. Of 
these latter applications, 44 were for regular-route authority, 1 sought charter authority, 
and 34 were for authority as a broker. 
149. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,810 (1979). 
150. See Comments of U.S. Dep't of Transportation, at 4, Entry Flexibility, Regular 
Route Passenger Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7, 1980) (ICC 
Ex Parte No. MC-133). See generally Comments of the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability, supra note 29, at 7-9. 
New services proliferated during this period. Greyhound carried 190,000 passengers on 
9 new routes, Trailways hauled 3,800 riders over 5 new routes, and at least 11 other 
carriers began new service. Furthermore, diversity and innovation abounded for service 
to small and large communities alike. For example, Jack Rabbit Lines started service to 
Onida and Agar, South Dakota, whose populations were respectively 689 and 142. Latin 
Express began service aimed at Spanish-speaking passengers between points in Florida 
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ence with an open entry regime suggests that ending ICC entry 
controls, except for inquiries into fitness, would be the most ef-
fective and speediest method of injecting new competition into 
the industry, providing the public with new service, including 
service to rural America, and giving bus companies the opera-
tional flexibility to realign route systems in the most economi-
cally rational way. 
2. Reforms in entry policy made by the House bill- As 
noted, the House-passed bill does not go this far, for it still re-
quires carriers to apply for new authority and prove fitness every 
time they want to add new service. Nonetheless, the bill does 
provide some substantial reforms of present practices. Current 
ICC procedures place an affirmative burden on applicants to 
prove that new service is "required by the present or future pub-
lic convenience and necessity."m The House-passed bill eases 
this burden by: (1) replacing the "public convenience and neces-
sity" criterion with a "public interest" standard,1112 which the 
committee report indicates is to be "interpreted as a lower bar-
rier to entry than the 'public convenience and necessity' test";1113 
(2) requiring only that the proposed service be "consistent with" 
public convenience and necessity, rather than "required by" 
such public purpose; and (3) shifting the. burden of proof to 
protestants, in effect creating a presumption that approval of 
new service is in the public interest.1u Protests against applica-
tions for new authority can be made only by carriers that actu-
ally serve the market or that would otherwise be affected di-
rectly by the application;11111 furthermore, the Commission can 
award new authority merely on a showing of fitness, without re-
gard to "public interest," when a point is not receiving bus ser-
vice or the new authority would replace abandoned service. us 
and the Northeast. Town Tour Fun Bus Company offered new luxury service - featur-
ing meals, stereo, and card tables - between Orange County, California, and Las Vegas. 
Id. at 8-9. 
151. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(a)(2) (West Supp. 1981); see 45 Fed. Reg. 86,771, 86,776, 
86,789-93 (1980) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1100.251-.252). 
152. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(l)) (authorizing the Commission to grant a 
certificate to fit, willing and able carriers unless it finds "on the basis of evidence 
presented by any person objecting to the issuance of the certificate, that the transporta-
tion to be authorized by issuance of the certificate is not consistent with the public 
interest"). 
153. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29. 
154. Id. 
155. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(8)). 
156. Id. (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(5)). 
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While these reforms thus track the provisions of the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980 with respect to freight,157 they make one im-
portant step forward. Although the Motor Carrier Act shifted 
the burden of proof to protestants with respect to "public conve-
nience and necessity," applicants for new trucking authority still 
must make some showing that the new service would "serve a 
useful purpose, responsive to a public demand or need. "158 As a 
practical matter, this requires applicants to obtain affidavits of 
support from shippers, receivers, trade associations, public offi-
cials, or others in order to get approval for authority from the 
ICC.1119 The House-passed bill places no such requirement on ap-
plicants for new bus service - an important step, because con-
tested bus route cases in the past usually have involved battles . 
between bus company lawyers in developing batteries of mem-
bers of the public to support or oppose the application, 180 even 
though such evidence had little practical value to the 
Commission.181 
3. Potential negation of the House-passed entry reforms-
While the reforms discussed thus far offer the potential for eas-
ier entry into the industry and onto specific routes, that poten-
tial could be negated if the Commission adopts narrow interpre-
tations of the very vague statutory language such as "public 
interest" or "fit, willing and able." Several provisions in particu-
lar could be interpreted to make the burden of proof .easier for 
protestants asserting that the proposed new service would divert 
revenues or traffic away from them in a manner contrary to the 
"public interest." The House-passed bill states that diversion of 
revenues or traffic from incumbent carriers shall not by itself be 
sufficient to deny an application.182 Nonetheless, the application 
may be denied if issuance "would impair, contrary to the public 
interest, the ability of the [incumbent] carrier to provide a sub-
stantial portion of the regular-route passenger service which the 
carrier provides. "183 
Viewed in its most favorable light, this provision codifies the 
Liberty Trucking standard, 1" which allows companies to protest 
successfully if they can show that the proposed service threatens 
157. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, § 5 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 10922). 
158. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(b)(l) (West Supp. 1981). 
159. MOTOR CARRIER Ar:r HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 14. 
160. HouSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29. 
161. See note 147 supra. 
162. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(3)). 
163. Id. 
164. See note 91 and accompanying text supra. 
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not merely their continued operation on the route in question, 
but rather their continued existence. Approached from this per- · 
spective, the provision represents a salutary means for protect-
ing small carriers from Greyhound, while allowing such carriers 
to expand. After all, allowing Greyhound to serve a route could 
conceivably destroy a smaller carrier, while the converse seems 
highly unlikely: granting a small carrier authority to compete 
with Greyhound on a particular route may hurt Greyhound in 
that market, but would not threaten Greyhound's continued 
existence. 
The danger remains, however, that this language will not be so 
narrowly construed. The committee report states that this provi-
sion will prevent regular-route carriers from being "crippled by 
new applications who apply for excessively narrow grants of au-
thority designed to 'skim' the most lucrative traflic."1811 Simi-
larly, the bill instructs the ICC to consider as pertinent to the 
"public interest" whether granting the application would have 
an impact on small communities, 186 and the committee report 
suggests that applications could be denied if the new authority 
would siphon off lucrative traffic that subsidizes less profitable 
small-community service.187 In addition, the ICC is supposed to 
consider "any significant adverse impact" that granting an ap-
plication would have on commuter bus operations;188 again, the 
committee report suggests that incumbents could successfully 
protest on the ground that new charter service would diminish 
peak-hour traffic and force cutbacks in commuter service.189 
4. The bill's solicitude for small carriers and rural service-
These provisions are a far cry from open entry for all fit carriers. 
By allowing incumbents to argue that new service would permit 
"cream skimming," the House bill assumes the existence of 
cross-subsidies between various routes, a questionable assump-
tion in light of available evidence.170 Moreover, the bill seems to 
assume that small carriers need protection against larger carriers 
- particularly Greyhound - even though the American Bus As-
sociation has stated that smaller bus companies can compete 
successfully with larger companies171 and even though smaller 
165. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 31. 
166. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(4)(B)). 
167. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 31. 
168. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(4)(E)). 
169. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 31. 
170. See notes 112-15 and accompanying text supra. 
171. See note 32 and accompanying text supra. 
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companies appear to have lower average costs than Grey-
hound.172 According to one survey, the estimated average ex-
pense per bus-mile for Class I carriers was $1.40 in 1978, com-
pared to only $1.00 for Class II and m carriers. The significance 
of this disparity becomes apparent upon examination of 58 
routes identified by Trailways as unprofitable. The average loss 
per bus-mile stood at $0.44, with a range from $0.09 to $1.28, 
suggesting that a number of "loss" routes in fact could be ser-
viced at a profit by lower cost carriers, obviating the need for 
subsidies.173 
These data suggest that no need exists for denying applica-
tions out of fear for injury to smaller carriers or service to rural 
communities. By specifically sanctioning protests on these 
grounds, the House-passed bill should strengthen the hands· of 
incumbent carriers and, by making the applications process 
more expensive, may deter applications for new authority. These 
data also indicate that an open-entry policy for all fit carriers 
would be the best antidote for poor service, particularly to rural 
America. A small regional carrier can probably provide good ser-
vice at lower cost than larger national carriers, and in addition, 
may have the commitment to serving the region and a special-
ized knowledge of its needs. In fact, one study of service to rural 
communities found that in the short term "service to small 
towns seems no more threatened than that to larger cities. In 
fact, based upon the available financial data, it appears that the 
industry is healthier in rural areas than in highly urbanized ar-
eas. "17• Companies operating in the Southwest, which tends to 
be rural, showed greater profitability than firms in the more ur-
banized North Atlantic States,1715 . and service at many small 
Southwestern communities was so frequent that abandonment 
seemed unlikely if exit policy were also revised.178 Another study 
of service in Florida, where economic regulation ended abruptly 
and totally in July 1980, showed that free entry had caused no 
apparent harm to smaller firms; fifteen carriers other than Grey-
hound or Trailways were surveyed, and eight felt very strongly 
that they would or already had improved their market positions 
because of new opportunities provided since the end of intra-
state regulation.177 
172. See notes 30, 31 & 127 and accompanying text supra . . 
173. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 37. 
174. SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 35. 
175. Id. at 19. 
176. Id. at 22. 
177. Statement of Marcus Alexis, Acting Chairman, ICC, at 7, in House Bus Hear-
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C. Exit 
33 
Exit policy should be reformed to recognize that intercity bus 
travel forms part of a national transportation system and should 
be treated as such. Federal preemption of intrastate routes and 
rates is needed, not to enable federal regulation to replace state 
regulation, but for the purpose of allowing federal non-regula-
tion to displace state regulation. At the same time, sound exit 
policy would recognize the legitimate, useful role that state and 
local governments can play if a community or region is 
threatened with the loss of service. 
The House-passed bill does not wholly preempt state exit reg-
ulation of intrastate routes.178 Instead, it requires that bus com-
panies continue to seek approval from state regulatory agencies 
before either dropping entirely the intrastate portion of inter-
state service or reducing the frequency of such service to less 
than one trip per weekday.179 If the state agency denies the ap-
plication or fails to act within 120 days, the carrier can appeal to 
the ICC.180 Local parties can object to the discontinuance of ser-
vice, 181 and the bill directs the ICC to honor those protests if it 
finds that discontinuance or reduction is "not consistent with 
the public interest" or that continuing the service would not 
constitute an "unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. "182 
The House-passed bill makes no change in the current law on 
ings, supra note 16. See generally Interstate Commerce Comm'n, Commission Studies of 
Florida Motor Carrier Deregulation: An Interim Report 3-9 (April 1981) [hereinafter 
cited as ICC Fla. Deregulation Report]. 
178. In the area of exit, there is limited preemption of fares and entry on the intrd-
state portions of ICC-authorized interstate routes. The carrier must still seek approval 
from the state regulatory agency, but H.R. 3663 would let the carrier appeal adverse 
decisions to the ICC if the request is denied or not decided within a certain period of 
time. In the entry area, the House-passed bill could be used to eliminate so-called 
"closed door" restrictions which block intrastate service. For example, a carrier may 
serve the Boston to Cleveland route, with intermediate stops at Rochester and Syracuse, 
but be unable, because of state regulation, to carry local passengers between Rochester 
and Syracuse. Section 6 of H.R. 3663 would add a new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(2) to allow 
appeals to the ICC if requests to serve such intrastate legs are denied by the state 
agency. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17 at 33-34. 
Section 17 of H.R. 3663 would amend 49 U.S.C. § 11601 to enable the ICC to overturn 
state rate decisions on such intrastate legs as well, in response to complaints from the 
industry that state agencies keep the fares on these legs below fares on interstate legs of 
similar distance. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 21-27 & 44-46. 
179. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(a), 127 CoNG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 
19, 1981) (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10935(a)). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10935(c)). 
182. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10935(e)). 
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exit from interstate routes, which can be accomplished simply 
by filing an application to amend the certificate granting the 
authority.188 
An earlier provision of the House-passed bill, proposed by the 
ICC, offered a better approach to exit reform. That proposal 
would simply have preempted state regulation of exit on intra-
state portions of interstate routes, 184 and required the ICC to 
adopt a notice and substitution procedure for dealing with a 
proposed abandonment of either interstate or intrastate ser-
vice.185 Under this procedure, a bus company wishing to discon-
tinue service would be required to give notice to the ICC, the 
pertinent state agency, and the affected communities.188 Such 
notice would be intended to let the affected parties make ar-
rangements to retain the service, find a substitute carrier, or 
make plans for the abandonment. 
Under the ICC's proposal, service could be abandoned if no 
protest were filed, but a protest received within thirty. days 
would require the carrier within fifteen days to furnish the ICC 
and any protestants with an estimate of additional revenues or 
subsidies needed to continue service, along with supporting data 
on traffic, revenue, and other information needed to calculate an 
adequate subsidy level.187 Thereafter, the carrier could abandon 
service within thirty days unless (1) the ICC found further in-
vestigation to be needed in order to decide if the incumbent or 
another carrier could continue the service or (2) the carrier re-
ceived an offer of financial assistance, presumably in the form of 
a differential operating subsidy.188 In the latter case, if the car-
rier did not accept the offer within another thirty days, the 
Commission could either allow discontinuance or order the car-
rier to continue operations for another sixty days. If no agree-
ment was reached by the end of that sixty-day period, the bus 
company could then discontinue service.189 
The ICC's suggested approach has a number of desirable fea-
183. 49 u.s.c. § 10925 (Supp. m 1979). 
184. Section 14(b) of H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Seas: (1981), as originally proposed 
by the ICC, would have added a new 49 U.S.C. § lllOl(d) to prohibit states from regu-
lating discontinuance or scheduling of service along interstate portions of interstate 
routes. In addition, § 15(b) of that version would have amendetl 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b) by 
setting minimum standards that state regulatory agencies must follow if they wish to 
retain authority to regulate intrastate levels of passenger fares and express rates. 
185. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1981) (adding 49 U.S.C. § lllOl(d), (e)). 
186. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 11101(e)(2)). 
187. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 1110l(e)(3)). 
188. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 1110l(e)(4)). 
189. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 1110l(e)(5)). 
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tures. First, it forces the ICC to take a more active role in moni-
toring abandonment of service. Second, it prevents abrupt and 
total cessation of service, and - when viewed in conjuction with 
the open entry reforms suggested in this Article - allows the 
substitution of new carriers that may off er better service than 
the existing carrier. Finally, it gives state and local agencies, 
which are closely attuned to local transportation needs, the op-
portunity to find a substitute carrier or to pay for local service 
that cannot be economically justified but which local groups be-
lieve should be continued. Nine states presently support inter-
city bus service through direct subsidies, 190 and several states 
operate or fund specialized bus service for people with particular 
needs such as the elderly or the handicapped.191 In addition, 
Congress has authorized a grant program for transportation as-
sistance in rural and sinall urban areas,192 although the cost 
structure of bus firms may in fact make such subsidies unneces-
sary as a practical matter.198 
IV. ANTITRUST AND THE INTERCITY Bus INDUSTRY 
The antitrust laws curb anticompetitive activities in all indus-
tries not subject to ICC-type economic regulation. Any proposal 
for reducing ICC control over the bus industry must consider 
whether, in light of the skewed industry structure engendered by 
regulation, the antitrust laws could suffice to curb anticompeti-
tive · conduct in the industry should it be immediately deregu-
lated.194 Perhaps Greyhound's dominance would enable it to 
take advantage of deregulation and drive smaller companies out 
of business through monopolistic practices.195 Perhaps smaller 
companies would be better protected - and competition thus 
enhanced - if, at least for a transition period, Greyhound were 
subject to certain regulatory restraints on anticompetitive prac-
" 
190. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 25 (California, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnestoa, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia). See gen-
erally DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 34-35; ICC PRELtMINARY STUDY, 
supra note 18, at 101-04. 
191. Statement of William L. McCracken, Sr. Vice President, Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
at 11-12, in House Bus Hearings, supra note 16. 
192. Federal Public Transportation Act of 1978, § 313, 49 U.S.C. § 1614 (Supp. m 
1979). 
193. See notes 113-16 and accompanying text supra. 
194. See note 15 supra. 
195. For a detailed statement of these concerns, see Comments of '!'railways, Inc., 
supra note 6, at 37-143. 
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tices that would extend beyond the protections afforded by the 
antitrust laws against anticompetitive practices. 
The answer to these legitimate concerns is that the antitrust 
laws - enforced through private lawsuits and by federal agen-
cies - can be relied upon by Congress as a full substitute for 
ICC control over the intercity bus industry. Small bus compa-
nies can compete with the giants because of their generally lower 
costs and because the industry lacks the characteristics of a nat-
ural monopoly.198 Absent federal regulation, the intercity bus in-
dustry would exist in a structurally competitive organization and 
should be subjected to the antitrust laws in the same fashion as 
"nonregulated" firms. The fears of overreaching by the largest 
carriers appear to be unwarranted on purely economic grounds. 
That smaller carriers have little to fear in the way of monopo-
listic behavior is suggested by the experience in Florida, where 
all regulation of intrastate bus operations ceased in July 1980.197 
Greyhound has not monopolized service, and indeed, smaller 
companies perceive deregulation as a significant opportunity for 
expansion.198 Similarly, fears were expressed during debates on 
the Airline Deregulation Act that the trunk airlines would 
swamp the smaller companies, but in fact, the regional airlines 
are prospering while their larger competitors are losing market 
shares.199 
Immediate reliance upon the antitrust laws represents the 
best way to ensure a maximum of competition along with vigor-
ous strictures on anticompetitive behavior. As an alternative, 
however, Congress could phase-in full reliance on the antitrust 
laws by maintaining, at least for a few years, certain express re-
strictions on carrier conduct, particularly that of Greyhound. 
Such an alternative approach would respond to the concerns of 
smaller carriers that feel threatened by their larger competitors, 
giving them a transition period within which to realign their 
route structure and position themselves in the marketplace. The 
drawback of such a plan, though, is its maintenance of restric-
tions on the ability of larger carriers to respond to public need in 
situations that might force some smaller companies out of busi-
ness. Moreover, the Florida experience suggests there is no such 
need to protect smaller companies from predatory or anticompe-
196. See notes 26-32, 127 and accompanying text supra. 
197. See note 177 and accompanying text supra. 
198. See text accompanying notes 177 supra & 230 infra. 
199. See AIRLINE DEREGULATION: THE EARLY EXPERIENCE 91-157, 213-34 (J. Meyer & 
C. Oster eds. 1981). See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE CHANGING AIR-
LINE INDUSTRY: A STATUS REPoRT THROUGH 1980, at 26 (CED-81-103) (1981). 
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titive activities. 
Against this background, then, consideration can be given to 
specific anticompetitive activities that Greyhound might engage 
in by exercising its monopoly power. This will involve evaluation 
of how such conduct would be regulated under the antitrust 
laws, and what sort of short-term restraints Congress might seek 
to enact or retain if it preferred to defer immediate reliance on 
the antitrust laws. 
A. Setting Predatory Fares or Rates 
Defining a predatory fare is difficult at best, 200 and discussions 
of predatory pricing in case law and the literature have suffered 
from the "failure to delineate clearly and correctly what prac-
tices should constitute the offense, and exaggerated fears that 
large firms will be inclined to engage in it"; allegations of preda-
tory pricing often ignore "the possibility that the alleged 
predator's cost is ... more than covered by his price."201 Areeda 
and Turner posit that .predatory pricing makes economic sense 
only if (1) the putative predator has greater financial staying 
power than its competitors and (2) the predator has substantial 
chance that its losses will be exceeded by the profits to be 
earned after the competition is destroyed. 202 
In the intercity bus industry, where fixed costs are relatively 
low and entry barriers could be significantly reduced by regula-
tory reform, it is doubtful that Greyhound could engage in pred-
atory conduct. This seems particularly true if, as the evidence 
suggests, Greyhound's costs are higher than its smaller competi-
tors. 203 Even if Greyhound were to force out a competitor on a 
particular route through cut-rate pricing, the ease of entry under 
a deregulated environment would make it very difficult for Grey-
200. For example, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 2(a)(2), defined "preda-
tory" 83 "any practice which would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws 83 set 
forth in [the first § of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976))." 49 U.S.C. § 1301(35) 
(Supp. III 1979). 
201. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited 
83 Areeda & Turner]. See also Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A 
Comment, 89 HARv. L. REV, 869 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: 
A Reality, 89 HARV. L. REv. 891 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pric-
ing, 89 HARV. L. REv. 901 0976). For a fuller discussion of destructive competition, see 
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 198-206 
(1970). 
202. Areeda & Turner, supra note 201, at 698. 
203. See note 127 supra. 
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hound to avoid new competition that would siphon off potential 
monopoly profits. Moreover, considering that Greyhound faces 
the possibility of new competition not just on a few routes, but 
throughout its system, it seems highly doubtful that predatory 
pricing would or could make economic sense for Greyhound for 
any sustained period.204 Clearly, some smaller companies could 
be hurt should Greyhound cut its prices. However, simply lower-
ing fares to meet competition need not violate the antitrust 
laws205 - and indeed could have substantial public benefit - so 
that a general fare reduction might still be legal under the anti-
trust laws if Greyhound earns a profit.208 
Because predatory pricing likely would not emerge absent ICC 
controls, there seems no need to provide a special remedy for 
smaller bus companies. If, however, Congress wishes to retain 
transitional protection in this area, the ICC could be authorized, 
upon compliant or its own initiative, to suspend, investigate, or 
cancel fares as predatory, even if they fall within the zone of 
pricing freedom. This approach was taken in the House-passed 
Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1981,207 as well as both the Air-
line Deregulation Act208 and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. 209 
B. Entering a Market and Driving Out a Competitor 
If ICC entry controls for fit carriers were ended immediately, 
as this Article recommends, Greyhound would not violate the 
antitrust laws simply by entering a new route, even if the incum-
bent withdrew. Similarly, Greyhound could have a "monopoly" 
on a route that would not necessarily be illegal and might even 
benefit the public, for example, by establishing through-service 
on a single carrier. It seems unlikely, moreover, that a court re-
viewing a monopolization claim would consider a single city-pair 
route or even the surrounding region to be the relevant market, 
204. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 201, at 698-99. In recent congressional testi-
mony, Greyhound called predatory pricing in the bus industry "foolish, if not suicidal." 
Statement of William L. McCracken, Sr. Vice President, Greyhound Lines, Inc., at 34, in 
House Bus Hearings, supra note 16. 
205. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 
726 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). 
206. See Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 926 (10th 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). 
207. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11, 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 
1981) (amending 49 U.S.C. § 10708). . 
208. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)(4) (Supp. Ill 1979). 
209. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10708(d)(4) (West Supp. 1981). 
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absent more egregious conduct on the part of Greyhound. 210 
Under an open entry regime, some "bridge carriers" likely 
would be absorbed into larger companies or would decide to go 
out of business, but this would not necessarily be contrary to the 
public interest. Bridge carriers are usually small companies pro-
viding direct service between two points, while entry restrictions 
under ICC regulations often required a larger carrier to operate 
between those points only in a longer, more circuitous way.211 
Artificially reserving such direct service to bridge carriers does 
keep smaller companies in business, but it obviously can make 
travel more difficult and time-consuming for passengers who 
would be forced to switch to a bridge carrier to obtain the most 
direct route between two points. 
As a transitional measure, Congress could limit open entry by 
Greyhound·- and possibly Trailways as well - by allowing 
smaller companies to file protests under the Liberty Trucking 
standard:212 Greyhound could be denied a route if its entry 
threatened to drive the incumbent out of business. This ap- . 
proach presents servious drawbacks if maintained in effect for 
too long, because it could prevent Greyhound, or Trailways, 
from developing efficiencies that would benefit the public. The 
House-passed bill could be narrowly construed as allowing the 
Liberty Trucking standards of protection, although the bill's 
language creates the risk that new authority could be denied on 
other less appropriate grounds as well.213 
C. Refusing to Cooperate With Competitors 
1. Interline Service- Bus companies traditionally engage in a 
210. In light of Greyhound's national route network, national fare system, and na-
tional planning, it can be argued that the relevant market for monopolization claims in 
intercity bus service is national under the doctrine of United States v. Grinnell Corp., 
384 U.S. 563, 575 (1966). Even with a national market, however, there may be regional 
submarkets in which violations occur. For example, a three-state region was the area in 
which anticompetitive conduct was found to exist in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound 
Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S. 
322 (1978). 
211. This was the situation in Mt. Hood Stages v. Greyhound, 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 
1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978), where Mt. Hood 
was a "bridge carrier" operating direct service between Klamath Falls and Biggs, Oregon, 
while Greyhound operated more roundabout service that would have caused passengers 
to ride 110 more miles on a San Francisco-Spokane trip than if they switched to Mt. 
Hood. For a discussion of the special situation of bridge carriers, see ICC Bus STUDY 
GROUP REPORT, supra note 22, at 34-35. 
212. See note 91 and accompanying text supra. 
213. See notes 163-69 and accompanying text supra. 
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variety of cooperative activities designed to facilitate passenger 
travel. For example, they offer "interline" service, allowing pas-
sengers to make connections between routes that may not be 
served by one carrier. Such interlining is facilitated if carriers 
lease their terminal space to others, quote each other's fares, and 
make scheduling information about other lines available to pas-
sengers. Given the nature of intercity bus transportation, in a 
deregulated environment such practices would in all probability 
be continued voluntarily, for economic reasons·, particularly if 
carriers realign their route structures to achieve greater efficien-
cies. Suppose, for example, that in a less regulated environment 
Greyhound's route system and high cost structure make it advis-
able to concentrate on long-haul markets and to drop marginal 
or short-haul service, which presumably would be picked up by 
lower-cost regional carriers. Greyhound would then be more de-
pendent on the passenger "feed" provided through these smaller 
companies, so that its own economic interests would dictate vol-
untary interlining. 
If, however, Greyhound refused to interline, an affected car-
rier could receive monetary and injunctive relief under the anti-
trust laws - provided that Greyhound were acting with an anti-
competitive purpose and had the power to originate a 
substantial amount of traffic at the points in question. So the 
court held in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp.,214 
where Greyhound tried to drive a competing carrier out of busi-
ness by, inter alia, refusing to interline. Moreover, the conclu-
sion that Greyhound could violate the antitrust laws by refusing 
to interline is consistent with other decisions requiring a firm 
with requisite market power to refrain from using that power to 
preserve or extend its market share.215 
214. 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S. 
322 (1978). 
215. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (utility's 
refusal to wholesale power·to or allow the use of transmission lines by municipal distrib-
utors found violative of the Sherman Act); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 
143 (1951) (refusal by sole newspaper in area to accept advertisements from retailers also 
advertising with competing radio station held illegal); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern 
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (refusal to supply wholesaler with goods at 
other than retail prices held unlawful); United States v. Klearfiax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 
F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945) (refusal by sole manufacturer of material to sell to distribu-
tor so that distributor could compete for government contract held a violation of § 2 of 
the Sherman Act). 
Thus, Greyhound's use of its dominant market power to bar a competitor from the 
market by refusing to deal might be a violation of the antitrust laws. See Crew, Do Anti-
trust Laws Provide a Feasible Alternative to Regulation?, 47 ICC PRAc. J. 673, 681 
(1980). 
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An alternative to immediate reliance on the antitrust laws to 
ensure adequate interlining would be retention of that portion of 
the Interstate Commerce Act making interlining mandatory for 
bus companies.216 Indeed, the House-passed bill does not alter 
bus companies' obligations to construct through-routes and joint 
fares. This approach guarantees the continued existence of in-
terline service, which often makes economic sense217 and will 
likely be provided in any event, particularly if large carriers em-
phasize longer routes and rely on smaller carriers to operate 
"feeder" service. 
2. Terminal access- Access to Greyhound terminals by com-
peting carriers raises related problems, because interlining re-
quires that passengers be able to catch connecting buses quickly 
and conveniently. The fear has been expressed that Greyhound 
might attempt to deter interlining or steer passengers toward its 
own service by limiting access to its terminals.218 
This problem is somewhat more difficult than questions of in-
terlining, particularly because bus terminals, unlike airports, are 
privately owned and are subject to legitimate space limitations. 
Various decisions, however, suggest that the antitrust laws obli-
gate Greyhound to make its terminals available to competing 
carriers. Under the "bottleneck theory" of antitrust liability,219 
"a business or group of businesses which controls a scarce facil-
ity has an obligation to give competitors reasonable access to 
it."22° For example, in United States v. Southwestern Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 221 Greyhound and other bus companies oper-
ated a terminal used by a small, local line. The local line was 
evicted from the bus terminal after it arranged with another car-
rier to offer competing interstate service. While the district court 
acknowledged that Greyhound had no obligation to accept any 
carrier as a tenant, nonetheless the eviction of the local bus line, 
motivated by anticompetitive animus, was found to be a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. 232 
216. 49 U.S.C. § 10703(a)(3) (Supp. ill 1979). 
217. See text following note 213 supra. 
218. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 49. 
219. See Mid-Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 
1372, 1387 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980). 
220. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979). 
221. (1953) Trade Cas. 68,355 (N.D. Okla.). 
222. See also Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) (wholesaler tenant's eviction from building 
owned by other wholesalers in most convenient location held unlawful); United States v. 
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912) (carriers' prevention of competing carrier's 
use of railroad terminal held violative of Sherman Act where geographic constraints fun. 
ited city to only one station); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (asso-
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Thus, case law clearly suggests that Greyhound has a duty to 
deal with its competitors on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
basis in allowing them to use terminal space, and can be liable 
for failure to do so. Indeed, by the terms of a 1957 consent de-
cree that ended an antitrust suit brought by the Justice Depart-
ment, Greyhound is enjoined from discriminating against "a bus 
operator, using a terminal owned or controlled by [Greyhound] 
in the provision of usual terminal services and facilities . . . in-
cluding, but not limited to, the sale and issue of tickets, the 
routing of passengers, and the dissemination of travel 
information. "223 
While terminal access for smaller carriers may be adequately 
ensured by the antitrust laws, the problems presented by access 
to competitors' facilities deserve thorough examination. The 
House-passed bill directs the Secretary of Transportation and 
the ICC to investigate the ownership, location, and adequacy of 
bus terminals in providing passenger service. 224 This study 
should be highly useful in determining what steps, if any, Con-
gress should take in this area. It may well be true that the 1957 
consent decree - combined with the "bottleneck theory" of an-
titrust liability - adequately protects smaller carriers. On the 
other hand, there may be the need for a mandatory access provi-
sion of the sort that already exists for the railroads.2211 At this 
stage, more information is needed. 
3. Proscription of unfair practices under the Interstate Com-
merce Act- Aside from refusing to interline or barring competi-
tors from terminals, Greyhound might engage in other anticom-
petitive actions, such as routing traffic around a bridge carrier to 
drive it out of business, refusing to quote an interlining carrier's 
fare, or arranging schedules to preclude connections. While such 
actions may be an illegal refusal to deal, upon a proper showing 
of Greyhound's dominance and anticompetitive purpose, they 
may also be proscribed under a provision of the Interstate Com-
merce Act requiring that a "practice related to transportation or 
service provided by a carrier ... must be reasonable."228 Al-
though broadly worded, the ICC could use this section more vig-
orously to prosecute and deter "unfair or deceptive practices or 
unfair methods of competition" in the same way those practices 
ciation's bylaws restricting competitors of members from membership found unlawful). 
223. United States v. Greyhound Corp., [1957) Trade Cas. 73,086, 73,089 (N.D. Ill.). 
224. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 26, 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 
1981). 
225. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 11103 (West Supp. 1981). 
226. Id. § 10701(a). 
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are proscribed for "nonregulated" industries by section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act. 227 As part of full deregulation, 
Congress could transfer to the FTC the authority to regulate 
such anticompetitive practices in the intercity bus industry, cre-
ating a remedy · for small carriers injured by any unfair 
practices. 228 
CONCLUSION 
Deregulation of the intercity bus industry will go a long way 
toward improving service to passengers. The Bus Regulatory Re-
form Act of 1981, passed recently by the House of Representa-
tives, makes some changes but does not go far enough. If any-
thing, this is one area where Congress could start catching up 
with the states. In July 1980, Florida became the first state to 
end public utility-style intrastate regulation of transportation 
companies, and the voters of Arizona overwhelmingly approved 
a similar approach in November 1980.229 Although the Florida 
experience is too new to draw any definitive conclusions, an ICC 
study reported in April 1981 that: (1) Greyhound and Trailways 
had increased their total weekly scheduled miles by eight and 
seven percent, respectively; (2) carriers were experimenting with 
new fare options; (3) charter service had improved, and bus 
companies were using their equipment more efficiently; and (4) 
where service losses occurred due to shifts in regular-route ser-
vice, either another carrier entered the market, another carrier 
remained in the market, or another carrier was providing service 
to a nearby community.230 
ICC regulation of the intercity bus industry developed during 
the 1930's, when assuring the :financial stability of American 
227. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). . 
228. In this connection, it should be noted that private antitrust litigation, while ex-
pensive and time-consuming, is always available. In the leading case of Mt. Hood Stages, 
Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978), Greyhound was found to have attempted to run Mt. Hood 
out of business by refusing to quote Mt. Hood's fares to potential interline passengers, 
by arranging schedules that routed passengers around Mt. Hood's more direct bridge 
service, by refusing to distribute Mt. Hood's schedules in Greyhound stations, and by 
ending interline service with Mt. Hood. Because of the novel legal issues in the case, Mt. 
Hood· did not recover damages for over a decade. Nonetheless, the treble-damage award · 
was $13.1 million, plus $1.25 million in attorneys' fees and costs. 
229. See MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, et 20, 25-26. 
230. ICC Florida Deregulation Report, supra note 177, at 3-9. See also Washington 
Post, Dec. 26, 1980, et C6, col. 1; U.S. DEP'T OP TRANSPORTATION, DEREGULATION AND 
INTERCITY Bus OPERATIONS IN FLoawA: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 67-69 (1981). 
44 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:1 
business was a top priority. As America enters the 1980's, how-
ever, the challenges are double-digit inflation, a stagnant econ-
omy, and an uncertain world oil situation. These problems de-
mand not stifling cartel regulation, but more competition, 
greater productivity, and increased fuel conservation. Deregula-
tion will not solve all the problems of the intercity bus industry; 
it will not undo the business cycle or bring down the price of 
fuel. Yet it will encourage competition by giving the bus indus-
try new operating flexibility and new incentives to innovate, 
thereby improving service to the travelling public. 
